The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 16 (2002)

Article 10

Can the Taxing Power Be Delegated?
Peter W. Hogg
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Hogg, Peter W.. "Can the Taxing Power Be Delegated?." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases
Conference 16. (2002).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol16/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

CAN THE TAXING POWER BE
DELEGATED?
Peter W. Hogg*

I. THE POWER TO TAX
Both the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces have the
power to levy taxes. In the case of the Parliament, the power is conferred by
section 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867,1 and it extends to “any mode or
system of taxation”. In the case of the Legislatures, the power is conferred by
section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and it is limited to “direct taxation
within the province”.2 For the most part these powers are not interpreted or
applied any differently than other legislative powers that are distributed by the
Constitution Act, 1867. But section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does single
out the taxing and spending powers by providing that a bill imposing any tax or
spending public monies “shall originate in the House of Commons”. Section 54
goes on to provide that the House of Commons shall not enact a bill for the
spending of public monies unless the bill was recommended by message of the
Governor General. By virtue of section 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
sections 53 and 54 apply to the provinces as well as to the federal government
with appropriate modifications to the language.
The special treatment of the taxing and spending powers has its origin in the
conflict between the King and Parliament in England in the 17th century. Democratic
governance
required
that
the
powers
to tax and spend be approved by the elected House of Commons. Experience
showed that, if the King was not dependent on Parliament for supply, the King
would be able and willing to govern without reference to the House of Commons; in other words, the unelected King was free to govern without regard for

* Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. This paper was prepared for presentation to the conference entitled “2001 Constitutional Cases” held at the Professional Development
Centre of the Osgoode Hall Law School on April 12, 2002.
1
The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
2
An account of the taxing powers is to be found in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada
(4th ed., 1997), ch. 30.
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the wishes of the people. As we shall see, this archaic problem is not entirely
without its modern counterpart.
Sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867 constitute manner and form
requirements for the enactment of bills to impose taxes (or spend public monies). Do they also impose substantive restrictions on the powers to tax? In
particular, do they preclude Parliament or the legislatures from delegating the
power to tax?

II. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
The general rule of Canadian constitutional law is that Parliament and the
legislatures have the power to delegate their legislative powers. 3 This doctrine
also had its origin in 17th century England, where the courts denied the power
of the King to make new laws of his own initiative, but accepted the King’s
power to make laws if he acted pursuant to a delegation enacted by Parliament.
Democratic governance was sufficiently preserved if the law-making of the
King and his ministers was circumscribed by Parliament itself. Canadian courts
accepted the same doctrine, permitting Parliament to delegate its powers to the
Governor in Council, to ministers, to officials or to administrative agencies.
There was initially some controversy as to whether the provincial Legislatures
enjoyed the same power, but the courts held that they did, so that the
Legislatures were permitted to delegate to the Lieutenant Governor in Council,
to ministers, to officials, to municipalities, to school boards and to
administrative agencies. In fact, extraordinarily sweeping powers were
delegated by Parliament to the Governor in Council in the War Measures Act,
under which Canada was governed during both world wars, and those powers
were upheld by the courts.4 The provinces have also from time to time engaged
in sweeping delegations of legislative power, for example, to establish
marketing schemes, and these have been upheld. 5
There are some limits on the power to delegate legislative power, 6 but none
that are relevant to the present topic. For present purposes, it may be assumed
that the power to delegate legislative power is unlimited. The question is
whether the power to tax is in a different category as the result of the requirement of section 53 that a bill imposing a tax must originate in the House of
Commons (or provincial Legislative Assembly). A tax levied under a delegated

3

An account of the law respecting delegation is to be found in Hogg, supra, note 2, ch. 14.
Re Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150.
5
Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] A.C. 708.
6
The important one is the prohibition on federal inter-delegation, namely, the delegation of
legislative power from Parliament to the provinces and vice versa: see Hogg, supra, note 2, ch. 14.
4
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power would not originate in the House of Commons. The policy argument
against permitting delegation of the taxing power is that a delegation reduces
the democratic control of taxation by permitting taxes to be imposed or increased secretly — without the normal public debate in the legislative assemblies. We shall see that this concern persists to this day.

III. DELEGATION OF THE POWER TO TAX
There have been three cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada has
considered the question whether the taxing power could be delegated. Each
case has yielded a different (and inconsistent) answer. The first case is
Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act.7 In that case, a
constitutional attack was mounted against the levies on farmers that were
imposed by marketing boards. The boards were created under authority granted
in a federal statute, and the statute empowered the boards to impose levies. The
argument was that the levies were taxes which could not be imposed by a
delegated body. The Court held that the levies were not taxes (they were
administrative or regulatory charges), so there was no need to resolve the issue.
But Pigeon J. for the majority of the Court in an obiter dictum answered the
question anyway. He acknowledged that section 53 of the Constitution Act,
1867 appeared to be a bar to the delegation of the taxing power. But he pointed
out that section 53 could be amended by the federal Parliament alone,8 and he
said that any delegation by Parliament of the power to impose taxes should be
regarded as an implicit amendment of section 53. Therefore, the taxing power
can be delegated. This reasoning is open to criticism. So long as section 53 has
not in fact been amended, it surely ought to be obeyed. The fact that section 53
can be amended ought not to justify its being disregarded, which is what the
theory of implied amendment allows.
The second case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered
whether the taxing power could be delegated is Eurig Estate (Re).9 In that case,
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a probate fee imposed by the prov-

7

[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198.
At that time, the power of amendment was in s. 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 &
31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867). That provision has been repealed and
replaced by s. 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982), which would also authorize the amendment by
Parliament alone of s. 53 or s. 54.
9
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 565. On the issue of the effect of s. 53, the majority opinion of Major J.
was disagreed with by both the concurring opinion of Binnie J. (who struck down the tax on
administrative-law grounds) and the dissenting opinion of Bastarache J. (who would have upheld
the tax).
8
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ince of Ontario on the estates of deceased persons. The probate fee was levied
by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, acting under a statutory power to impose “fees” in court proceedings. The Court unanimously held that the probate
fee had as its main purpose the raising of revenue (as opposed to defraying
expenses) and was therefore a tax. The Court by a majority then held that the
tax was invalid for failure to comply with section 53 of the Constitution Act,
1867. Justice Major speaking for the majority, held that section 53 “ensures
parliamentary control over and accountability for taxation” by “requiring any
bill that imposes a tax to originate with the legislature”, and prohibiting “any
other body other than the directly elected legislature from imposing a tax on its
own accord”.10 Moreover, section 53 “is a constitutional imperative that is
enforceable by the courts”.11 What of the obiter dictum in the Agricultural
Products Marketing case that any inconsistent legislation should be upheld as
an indirect or implicit amendment of section 53? Justice Major said that the
dictum should no longer be followed. It was true that section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 empowered a provincial Legislature to amend the constitution
of the province, and it was also true that the requirement of section 53 was a
provision that could be amended under that power, but section 45 should be
interpreted as requiring that any such amendment be direct or express, not
merely indirect or implied. 12 The probate fee, being a tax that had not been
imposed by the legislature itself, was therefore invalid. 13
Eurig Estate (Re) did not have to decide the question whether the taxing
power could be delegated. The Ontario legislature had enacted a statute delegating the Lieutenant Governor in Council the power to levy “fees” in court
proceedings, but it had not delegated the power to levy a tax. “Therefore”, said
Major J., “whether it could constitutionally do so does not need to be addressed.”14 However, in an earlier passage, Major J. implied that the answer
was no, because he said:

10

Id., paras. 30 and 32. Justice Bastarache, dissenting, took the view that s. 53 was addressed
only to the relationships between an upper and lower house; since no province had a bicameral
legislature anymore, s. 53 had become redundant in its application to the provinces (para. 54).
Justice Binnie, concurring in the result, took a similar view that s. 53 was applicable only to “legislative procedure”, and if a taxing measure never took the form of a “bill” s. 53 had no work to do
(para. 60).
11
Id., para. 34.
12
Id., para. 35.
13
The province immediately enacted the Estate Administration Tax Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c.
34, to impose a tax at the same rates and on the same base as the probate fee, and made the legislation retroactive to 1950, when the probate fee had first been imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council.
14
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, para. 36; see also para. 39.
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my interpretation of s. 53 does not prohibit Parliament or the legislatures from vesting any control over the details and mechanism of taxation in statutory delegates
such as the Lieutenant Governor in Council.15

With respect, the facts of the Eurig case demonstrated quite dramatically that
it should not be possible for the taxing power (apart from details and mechanism) to be delegated. Once a taxing power has been delegated, the resulting
taxes do in practice escape the democratic accountability that occurs when a
bill is introduced in the legislative assembly. This was demonstrated quite
clearly by the history of Ontario’s probate fee. It had been increased tenfold
since 1950 when the power was vested in the Lieutenant Governor in Council,
and the last increase, which was a tripling of the rate in 1992, was quietly imposed by order in council after the government of the province publicly announced that there would be no further increases in taxation! 16
The third case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered the
question of whether the taxing power can be delegated is O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario
(Attorney General).17 In that case, the question was whether the power to fix the
rate of Ontario’s property tax for education could be delegated. The property
tax was imposed by statute, but the statute stipulated that the rate was to be
fixed by the Minister of Finance. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the
power to fix the rate was an essential element of the power to tax so that a
delegation of the power to tax had indeed occurred. And the Court went on to
hold that, while only the legislature could create a new tax, the imposition of
the tax could be delegated so long as the delegation was contained in a statute
in language that was “express and unambiguous”. The “democratic principle”
was preserved by the fact that “the legislation expressly delegating the imposition of the tax must be approved by the legislature.” 18 In this case, the Minister’s power to set the rate of the property tax was contained in the Education
Act in express and unambiguous language. The delegation was therefore valid.
The Ontario English Catholic Teachers case cannot easily be interpreted as a
case in which only the “details and mechanism” of taxation were delegated.
The phrase “details and mechanism” was never referred to, and the literal reading of the Court’s opinion is that even an essential element of the power to tax
can be delegated without offending section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It
seems therefore that, after the twists and turns of Agricultural Products Market-

15

Id., para. 30 (emphasis added).
None of these increases had anything to do with inflation, because the rate was an ad valorem one, consisting of a percentage of the value of the estate, which would of course automatically
rise with inflation.
17
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 470. Justice Iacobucci wrote the opinion of the Court.
18
Id., para. 74.
16
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ing and Eurig, the Court has finally provided an answer to the question whether
the taxation power can be delegated. The answer, however, is the wrong one.
While it is clearly established (and obviously necessary) that other legislative
powers be subject to delegation, the taxing power is distinctive. It is distinctive
for the legal reason that section 53 singles it out for the requirement that any
bill must originate in the House of Commons. Admittedly, that is not the clearest possible declaration that delegation is prohibited, but a prohibition on delegation is, it is submitted, implicit in section 53. It must be remembered that the
taxing power is the one upon which the rest of governance depends. As the
King and Parliament both recognized in the 17th century, nothing important
can be done without resources, and it is control of the taxing power that provides the resources. Moreover, no other power has as direct and immediate an
effect on citizens as the taxing power, and (for that reason) nothing government
does is as unpopular as the imposition and collection of taxes. 19 There is a huge
incentive for governments to offload this power to a delegate, who can raise
taxes quietly without any irritating fuss in the Parliament or Legislature, and
who can shoulder the blame when the media do get wind of the action. The
action of the government of Ontario in 1992 in tripling probate fees by order in
council after having publicly promised to stop raising taxes perfectly illustrates
the mischief of delegation in the case of the taxing power. The Court should
have interpreted section 53 as prohibiting the delegation of this primary instrument of democratic governance.

19
I take this to be a proposition for which no authority is needed, but consider the Goods and
Services Tax, which continues to be unpopular despite the fact that it has been in force for more
than a decade, that the (Progressive Conservative) government that introduced it has been defeated,
and the current federal (Liberal) government’s only sin is its failure to repeal it!
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